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WHITMAN IN THE ABSTRACT
AS A REAL-ESTATE DEVELOPER and contractor during the gestational 
years of Leaves of Grass, Walt Whitman’s livelihood depended on his 
ability to add, subtract, multiply, and divide. Based on receipts collected 
by Charles Feinberg, it is clear that Whitman took these mathematics 
seriously, at least when it came to money.1 (Try dividing 211.5 by 8 
on paper, without using long division, and you will get a sense of his 
capabilities.)2 Like Herman Melville, Whitman taught arithmetic as 
a young schoolmaster, but while Melville earned a certificate in engi-
neering and maintained a lifelong interest in mathematics and math 
textbooks, Whitman’s knowledge of the discipline was probably less 
extensive.3 Nevertheless, he had powerful feelings about math, some 
positive, some negative. On the one hand, Whitman felt a certain 
suspicion of figures, and figurers especially. It appears in his poetry, 
most infamously in his distaste at “the proofs, the figures, . . . the 
charts and the diagrams” of the “learn’d astronomer.”4 He voiced it 
even more frequently in private life, often in reference to his book 
sales. Whitman once told friend and scribe Horace Traubel that “They 
say, figures can’t lie. I would suggest the saying without the ‘can’t,” 
to which Traubel suggested that “figures can’t lie, but figurers can.” 
(That got a laugh out of Whitman. “This is better—and they do!”5) 
Yet, with all his skepticism of quantifiers, Whitman was one himself: 
in verse, Whitman quantifies ecstatically.
It is understandable how large numbers might become some-
thing of a poetic fetish, for a poet of the “kosmos.” Of the size of the 
universe, Whitman ventures in his 1855 Leaves of Grass that “[a] few 
quadrillions of eras, a few octillions of cubic leagues, do not hazard 
the span,” and that the reader may “See ever so far . . . . [yet] there 
is limitless space outside of that,/ Count ever so much . . . . there is 
limitless time around that.”6 Or, again in the 1855 Leaves, readers feel 
the force of his insistence that “[t]his minute that comes to me over the 
past decillions,/ There is no better than it and now” (52). Second only 
to Melville, Whitman is probably the most arithmetical (numerolog-
ical? arithmophilic?) of nineteenth-century poets, a status that begs 
the questions: What do Whitman’s numbers tell us about the philos-
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ophy of his poetics? Of what use is mathematics to a poet? As good 
a starting point as any may be Whitman’s “decillions.” They appear 
not once but twice in the 1855 Leaves. Writing of the origins of “this 
round and delicious globe,” Whitman reveals that “I do not think it 
was made in six days, nor in ten thousand years, nor ten decillions” 
(LG1855 92). Whether coming to Leaves of Grass for the first time 
or the hundredth, readers may find themselves pausing, yet again, at 
that final word. What, indeed, is a decillion? It is clearly a very, very, 
very large number, a “1” at the head of a long line of zeroes; I doubt 
most readers could say exactly how many, off the top of their heads.7
(I certainly couldn’t.) Even so, the “-illions” stem indicates that a 
decillion is a number on a truly intergalactic scale, massive beyond all 
imagination. Here, then, is the most immediate function of selecting 
such a number: Whitman, the lifelong etymologist and word lover, 
deliberately chooses the freshest word, direct, unusual, poetically unas-
sociated, free of threadbareness. For its being unfamiliar, even jarring, 
a “decillion” or an “octillion” carries more heft than, say, “infinite”—
which word, to be fair, makes its share of appearances in Leaves. By 
Whitman’s day, “infinite” had already been a poetic mainstay for the 
better part of a millennium, used by everyone from Shakespeare to 
describe jest, to Milton to describe wrath and despair, to Browning to 
describe passion, to Marlowe to describe riches in a little room. It is a 
word that, in a poetics of multitudes (like Whitman’s), begs to appear 
over and over. The risk, of course, is detachment from reality. Infinity 
is not so much a number but a concept, one with no precise referent 
in nature. Used too liberally, “infinite” can become mere rote sound, 
as opaque as sermon Latin. Whitman, who would have no opacity in 
poetry, reminds himself in a jotted note, to
In future Leaves of Grass[,] Be more severe with the final revision of the poem, 
nothing will do, not one word or sentence, that is not perfectly clear—with pos-
itive purpose—harmony with the name, nature, drift of the poem. Also no or-
naments, especially no ornamental adjectives, unless they have come molten hot, 
and imperiously prove themselves. No ornamental similes at all—not one: perfect 
transparent clearness sanity and health are wanted—that is the divine style—O if 
it can be attained— (NUPM 1:385)
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Language, Emerson’s “fossil poetry,” fossilizes in its repetition, and by 
the nineteenth century oft-repeated words like “infinite” and “God” 
must have seemed terribly calcified.8 To merit enfolding into Leaves, 
a word needed juice. As he would later tell Traubel of his poetics, 
“[i]t is a reminiscence of the open air, the sky, the sea, and no one 
knows how precious these are—have been—to me. And indeed, it 
is to surcharge ‘Leaves of Grass’ with them that was my presiding 
spinal purpose from the start” (WWWC 7:414). Thus, Whitman’s 
mathematics demonstrates his insistence on the unfamiliar over the 
shopworn, on words that “come molten hot, and imperiously prove 
themselves.”
 Yet, per the premise of a great deal of literary theory, words are 
not the things they signify. A “trillion” may convey a more visceral 
sense of immensity than “infinite,” but each is still eight black marks 
on paper (or in pixels). Regardless of imagistic heft, the abstractness 
of math, especially in its long Pythagorean and Platonic idealist tradi-
tions, would seem to run counter to the spirit of Whitman’s poetry.9
That spirit, the “brawn” of Leaves of Grass, he wrote in 1876, 
is a sense of the life, as it should be, of flesh and blood, and physical urge, and 
animalism. While there are other themes, and plenty of abstract thoughts and 
poems in the volume . . . to make a type-portrait for living, active, worldly, healthy 
personality, objective as well as subjective, joyful and potent, and modern and 
free, distinctively for the use of the United States, male and female, through the 
long future—has been, I say, my general object.10
Whitman may have had some instinct that math, for all its imagistic 
force, might well flatten out the poetry. Indeed, his superficial attrac-
tion to numbers often belies, for the reader new to Whitman, his coun-
tervailing suspicion of enumeration. The poet’s arithmetical moments, 
the “decillions” and “octillions” and so on, often come couched in 
a broader skepticism of abstraction, of what Emerson might call the 
“evanescence and lubricity” of the mathematical object, its inability 
to convey essence or tangibility. (“Pure or speculative Mathematics,” 
as Whitman writes to himself, “considers quantity abstractly, with-
out relation to matter.”11) Thus, “[a] few quadrillions of eras, a few 
octillions of cubic leagues,” he writes, “do not hazard the span” of the 
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universe”; “[t]his minute that comes to me over the past decillions,/ 
There is no better than it and now” (LG1855 28; emphasis mine). 
Whitman adds that “I do not think seventy years is the time of a man 
or woman,/ Nor that seventy millions of years is the time of a man 
or woman,/ Nor that years will ever stop the existence of me or any 
one else” (LG1855 92; again, emphasis mine). Indeed, his misgivings 
about counting almost invariably crop up when Whitman is (what 
else) counting, and this from a man who loves to count. It is he, after 
all, who tallies the words of the West’s great epics—895,752 in the 
Bible (“excluding the Apocrypha”), 115,500 in the Aeneid, 96,500 in 
Paradise Lost, 150,500 in the third edition of Leaves of Grass.12 But it is 
also Whitman who writes, of “[t]he premises of the prudence of life,” 
that “[n]o specification is necessary . . to add or subtract or divide is 
in vain” (LG1855 x). Math is, as Whitman describes it, “the science 
that treats of quantity, whatever can be measured, numbered etc,” 
but his poetic conceits are often those things that cannot be measured 
or numbered—the “procreant urge” of “pent up, aching rivers,” the 
soul like a “noiseless patient spider,” the “glories strung like beads on 
my smallest sights and hearings.”13 Numbers must fail.
It is a failure that goes to the heart of the philosophy of Leaves 
of Grass—by which I do not mean its guiding poetic principles, but 
more literally its ontology and epistemology. What is real? How do 
we come to know it, and to what extent can it be communicated? 
Whitman’s answers, such as they are, set him apart from literary tradi-
tions against which his poetry is, in part, a reaction. The romantic 
and transcendental epistemologies of the sublime, of direct, aesthetic 
connection to the natural world, of course form a foundation for much 
of the poetry of the nineteenth century, Leaves of Grass included, 
but as Whitman’s investment in mathematics suggests, his philos-
ophy departs from these in both scale and materiality. For Whitman, 
sublimity is not a function of mere vastitude; it may indeed be expe-
rienced on any scale, the small just as well as large, from something 
as simple and unromantic as a blade of grass, or the feel of a book, 
with none of the requisite existential awe. And materially, Whitman 
seems, superficially at least, to abhor the vacuum of the abstract. The 
iron thread through Leaves of Grass is his insistence, contra tran-
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scendentalism, that there is nothing more than the physical cosmos, 
no Platonic ideals or Emersonian Over-soul, nothing beyond what is 
tangible and immediate. What better way to democratize the poetic 
experience? Yet, the irony of such philosophical commitments, as illus-
trated by Whitman’s ambivalence toward numbers, is that even the 
least abstract of poetics is still founded upon abstractions, signifiers.
Why, in other words, did Whitman build a life’s work from some-
thing so abstract as words? An artist and friend to artists, he could have 
worked in any medium he chose, music, marble, paint, clay, wood—
indeed, the man who wrote the first edition of Leaves was a wood-
worker. Yet, for him, even wood seems not to have had the materiality 
of language. “Great is language,” Whitman effuses, “it is the mightiest 
of the sciences, / It is the fulness and color and form and diversity of 
the earth . . . . and of men and women . . . . and of all qualities and 
processes; / It is greater than wealth . . . . it is greater than buildings or 
ships or religions or paintings or music” (LG1855 94). Perhaps this is 
because, as Ed Folsom has argued, words had a particularly palpable 
physical reality for someone who had been a printer’s devil and type-
setter from the age of twelve. “Whitman,” he points out, “is the only 
major American poet of the nineteenth century to have an intimate 
association with the art of bookmaking.”14 Or perhaps Whitman’s 
engagements with numbering constitute some attempt to reconcile to 
the natural world a pursuit (mathematics) that had come, falsely, to 
seem remote from robust, everyday living. In his “Manly Health and 
Training” tract (1858), for example, the poet blames “the prevalence 
of a far more artificial life” of bean-counting, that “indoor work” of 
clerks and lawyers, for “the deleterious effect on the general health.”15
In Walden (1854), Thoreau’s dichotomy between manual labor and 
cerebral arithmetic is another fine example of this duality:
“But,” says one, “you do not mean that the students should go to work with 
their hands instead of their heads?” I do not mean that exactly, but I mean 
something which he might think a good deal like that; I mean that they should 
not play life, or study it merely, while the community supports them at this ex-
pensive game, but earnestly live it from beginning to end. How could youths 
better learn to live than by at once trying the experiment of living? Methinks 
this would exercise their minds as much as mathematics.16
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I doubt Whitman would have disagreed with this indictment of math; 
after all, in “Manly Health” he recommends exercise—and even vani-
ty!—as being “of quite as much importance as any . . . arithmetic.”17
Yet, even in his ambivalence toward mathematics as a practice, I do not 
see Whitman fully flinching away from the abstraction of numbers, 
any more than he abandons words for their being signifiers. To him, 
even pure concepts seem to have been part and parcel of the natural 
world, with their own poetic materiality.
Thus, I see great promise in the ongoing critical effort to read 
Whitman’s poetry from new-materialist perspectives. It is not only 
that Whitman’s poetry may be productively read from non-anthropo-
centric points of view, giving his numbers a vitality beyond their mere 
relation to people. (New materialism, after all, may be defined as the 
de-centering of humanity in the natural world.)18 Nor do Whitman’s 
poetics merely lend themselves to discussions of the rise of the mate-
rial sciences, physics, biology, chemistry, industrial technology, and so 
on—though they most certainly do. Rather, it is because of the tension 
in his poetry between object and perception, and the materiality with 
which he invests, almost synesthetically, even so seemingly abstract 
an object as a number—and all this in the face of his commitment 
to the direct, the noumenal. Are numbers, too, things in Whitman’s 
kosmos? In a poetics of the material multitude, does multitudinous-
ness itself merit materiality?
It is tempting to say yes. Indeed, we might even try to fit Leaves
to some sort of neo-platonic ontology, in which reality is founded 
upon the unit, the One—or, perhaps better, to a Badiouan ontology 
in which not the one but the many, the very multitude, independent 
of its constituent objects, is reality, the bedrock of nature. French 
philosopher Alain Badiou posits this ontology in his Being and Event: 
“Insofar as being, qua being, is nothing other than pure multiplicity, 
it is legitimate to say that ontology, the science of being qua being, is 
nothing other than mathematics itself.”19 This philosophy is but the 
latest in a long tradition, explored by Immanuel Kant and formal-
ized by Gottlob Frege but stretching all the way back to Pythagoras. 
Are Whitman’s numbers their numbers? Here is where I begin to 
doubt. The relationship between math and poetry is, to put it mildly, 
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fraught. Badiou, for one, is not only careful to distinguish between the 
two, but also adamant that math is epistemologically truer, and that 
it thus lays greater claim to “first philosophy” than poetry ever could 
(a debate at least as old as Plato).20 It is doubtful that Whitman would 
have conceded such a point. He writes, after all, that “[t]he greatest 
of thoughts and truths . . . are not susceptible of proof like a sum in 
simple multiplication” (NUPM 1:183). This is not to insist that the poet 
is beyond platonic philosophy in practice, nor the abstract in general; 
indeed, even in his leaves of grass he sees the “uniform hieroglyphic” 
of numbers, their universal and abstract element—but that is the least 
of what he sees (LG1855 16). The grass is, more importantly, grass. 
To be touched, sniffed, loafed upon, fetched up in childish handfuls. 
Can Whitman, or any poet for that matter, ever truly be a platonist? 
As the mathematicians say: 
The answer is left as an exercise for the reader.
University of Houston                                        ZACHARY TURPIN
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